πŸ“‹ Ctrl+C, πŸ” Cryptographic 🌟 Easter πŸ₯š SEO πŸ’₯ Formatting πŸ” Admin 🌐 DNS πŸŒ€ Pure πŸ”€ One πŸ€– The 🏺 Ancient
⚑ medium auditacare.co.uk

1. Pasted the entire 123-Reg dashboard UI

The administrator accidentally pasted the entire UI text of the 123-Reg DNS management dashboard into the TXT record, including navigation menus and promotional text. You can read "Set up your free social media subdomain!" right in the global DNS.

Skip to main content 123 Reg Portfolio DNS Transfers Services Settings Activity Log Help Center DNS Management auditacare.co.uk Domain Settings Use My Domain Select a different domain DNS Records Forwarding Nameservers Hostnames DNSSEC Crypto Wallet Add a new record DNS records define how your domain behaves... Set up your free social media subdomain! Your domain comes with free, customizable subdomains such as facebook.auditacare.co.uk to link to your social media page.
⚑ medium 360contractservices.co.uk

2. Uploaded a JSON file payload into the TXT field

Instead of placing this JSON verification payload at their web root (/.well-known/), the administrator pasted the raw JSON directly into the DNS TXT field. The DNS zone is not a web server.

{"type":"domain_verification","token":"abc123xyz","domain":"360contractservices.co.uk","timestamp":"2023-01-15T10:30:00Z"}
⚑ medium fabmotors.co.uk

3. Pasted the entire Mailtrap setup sheet as one TXT record

The admin was given a list of four separate DNS records to create by Mailtrap (two CNAMEs, two TXTs). Instead of creating four records, they copied the entire instruction sheet verbatim into a single TXT field: `CNAME mt63.fabmotors.co.uk -> smtp.mailtrap.live TXT fabmotors.co.uk -> v=spf1...`. None of it works.

CNAME mt63.fabmotors.co.uk -> smtp.mailtrap.live TXT fabmotors.co.uk -> v=spf1 include:_spf.smtp.mailtrap.live ~all CNAME rwmt1._domainkey.fabmotors.co.uk -> rwmt1._domainkey.smtp.mailtrap.live TXT _dmarc.fabmotors.co.uk -> v=DMARC1;p=none
πŸ“ low alastairrankin.co.uk

4. Pasted the entire DNS setup wizard

The admin pasted the full instructional DNS setup wizard step-by-step guide directly into their TXT record. "CNAME Records: Find where to add a CNAME record... SRV Records..." is now part of the public DNS record for this domain.

CNAME Records: Find where to add a CNAME record in your DNS provider dashboard. SRV Records: Service records are used to specify the location of servers for specified services. MX Records: Mail exchanger records route email to the correct mail server...
πŸ“ low 1office.co.uk

5. Pasted the help-desk explanation instead of the SPF record

Instead of pasting the actual SPF record (v=spf1 include:...), the administrator pasted the help-desk article explaining why you need an SPF record. The record is effectively uselessβ€”but very educational for anyone who digs into their DNS.

An SPF record helps prevent email spoofing by specifying which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of your domain. Without one, your emails may be marked as spam. To add an SPF record, navigate to your DNS management panel and add a TXT record with the value v=spf1...

6. Left an inter-office email memo in DNS

A literal email memo to a colleague was left in the DNS zone. "Please add [email protected] to GA account... date 17.10.19." The memo has been publicly readable in global DNS ever since. Laurence may or may not have been added.

Please add [email protected] to GA account. Need manage users and edit permissions. date 17.10.19.
πŸ“ low ardgaygame.co.uk

7. Pasted the OpenAI domain verification instructions

Someone copied the entire OpenAI domain verification instruction page alongside the token. "To verify ownership, navigate to your DNS provider and add a TXT record with this value" is now permanently baked into the record alongside the actual verification token.

openai-domain-verification=dv-H2K18Y4C7jQD0N2EPSTVmMw1To verify ownership of ardgaygame.co.uk, navigate to your DNS provider and add a TXT record with this value

8. Pasted a Google Chrome highlighted URL

The admin pasted a Google Chrome highlighted search linkβ€”a long URL with fragment identifierβ€”to a tutorial on how to set up an email alias, directly into their DNS TXT field. It's a complete link, just… in the wrong place.

https://www.thewindowsclub.com/create-add-use-outlook-email-alias#:~:text=Go%20to%20your%20Microsoft%20email,right%20corner%20and%20select%20Options.
πŸ“ low amscope.co.uk

9. Left GA account add instructions in DNS

A developer left a request to add them to Google Analytics right in the DNS record: "GooGhywoiu9839t543j0s7543uw1 - pls add [email protected] to GA account UA-125314150-1 with Manage Users and Edit permissions - date 8-12-2022."

GooGhywoiu9839t543j0s7543uw1 - pls add [email protected] to GA account UA-125314150-1 with Manage Users and Edit permissions - date 8-12-2022.
πŸ“ low ccsonline.co.uk

10. Pasted "Example SPF record:" prefix into the live record

The software provider gave them an example of what their SPF record should look like, helpfully prefixed with "Example SPF record:". The admin copied the entire example β€” prefix and all β€” and pasted it into the live DNS field. The resulting record is invalid: `include:_spf.secure-decoration.com Example SPF record: v=spf1 a mx include:_spf.secure-decoration.com`. Their email delivery has been broken ever since.

include:_spf.secure-decoration.com Example SPF record: v=spf1 a mx include:_spf.secure-decoration.com
πŸ“ low glenoffice.co.uk

11. IT migration memo from September 2020 etched into DNS

An IT admin left a migration note in their DNS zone in September 2020: "A records set up on 9Sep20 to redirect naked domain to our website see admin.google.com/ac/domains Manage domains. The 4 IP addresses were displayed here." This was clearly an internal memo. It has been publicly readable in global DNS ever since.

A records set up on 9Sep20 to redirect naked domain to our website see admin.google.com/ac/domains Manage domains. The 4 IP addresses were displayed here.
πŸ“ low farmcider.co.uk

12. Copied the entire DNS form UI including the "OK Cancel" buttons

The administrator managed to copy the entire UI text of their registrar's DNS management form, including field labels, the domain name, TTL, all instructions, and β€” impressively β€” the literal button text "OK Cancel" from the form submission buttons. This may be the most complete accidental UI copy-paste ever committed to DNS.

Add a Resource Record to the Zone Record type TXT Domain name .farmcider.co.uk. TTL Default value: 86400 seconds TXT record * Required fields OK Cancel

13. Copied the entire Zoho Mail documentation sidebar into DNS

While setting up Zoho Mail, this admin selected and copied the entire left-hand navigation sidebar of the Zoho Mail documentation website. The TXT record contains: "ntact What are you looking for? Email hosting setup Zoho Mail plugin for cPanel Zoho Mail for Plesk Searching Admin Console Dashboard Users Roles and Privileges Groups..." The text starts mid-word at "ntact" (truncated from "Contact").

ntact What are you looking for? Email hosting setup Zoho Mail plugin for cPanel Zoho Mail for Plesk Searching Admin Console Dashboard Users Roles and Privileges Groups Domains...
πŸ“ low eggboxart.co.uk

14. Pasted the ACME SSL challenge instructions instead of the answer

This admin was told: "TXT record name/host: _acme-challenge.www | TXT record value: yiJMQ3XnuEDAmuJrXpfotkbJlvmXvzy_2BW_wPNwBck". Instead of following the instructions, they pasted the entire instruction sheet into the value field. The SSL certificate challenge failed immediately. The certificate was never issued.

TXT record name/host: _acme-challenge.www TXT record value: yiJMQ3XnuEDAmuJrXpfotkbJlvmXvzy_2BW_wPNwBck
πŸ“ low 10louise.co.uk

15. Copied the registrar's placeholder text alongside the Microsoft token

The admin copied the registrar's instructional placeholder text right alongside their Microsoft domain verification token. The record reads `@ or andeavour.co.uk MS=ms53858876`. The `@ or [domain]` part is the registrar's UI label for the host/name field β€” it was never meant to be in the value. The Microsoft token is buried in there somewhere but the record is invalid.

@ or andeavour.co.uk MS=ms53858876
πŸ“ low 0x64617665.co.uk

16. Pasted the Google MX record target into a TXT record

The TXT record for this domain contains `ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM` β€” which is the hostname used as the target of a Google Workspace MX record. The admin was setting up Google Workspace email and pasted the MX target value into the TXT field instead of the MX field. MX records and TXT records are completely different. This does absolutely nothing.

ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM
πŸ“ low 108builders.co.uk

17. Pasted the Microsoft nameserver hostname into a TXT record

The TXT record for 108builders.co.uk contains `ns1.bdm.microsoftonline.com` β€” a Microsoft nameserver hostname that belongs in a Nameserver (NS) or CNAME record. The admin copy-pasted it into a TXT field. It does absolutely nothing sitting in a TXT record.

ns1.bdm.microsoftonline.com

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